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HOW RUSSIA ‘DOES’ AND UNDERSTANDS 
DETERRENCE IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY
Western military strategists argue that three ingredients 
are essential for the successful deterrence of  an adversary. 
The irst is that the deterring state must make clear that 
its adversary should not undertake a particular course of  
action intended to revise the status quo. The second is 
that the deterring state must also indicate that it would 
inlict unacceptable harm on the adversary if  and only 
if  the adversary engages in that undesirable action. The 
third is that the threat to issue this harmful response must 
be believable. To this end, military strategists often argue 
that the credibility of  a threat hinges on the willingness 
and ability of  the issuer to carry it out. For example, the 
deterring state could signal that its adversary will experience 
di culties in achieving its battleield objectives (that is, 
deterrence-by-denial). Alternatively, the deterring state could 
retaliate with devastating force in the event that 
the adversary undertakes the proscribed action 
(that is, deterrence-by-punishment). Simply put, 
geopolitical interests and military capabilities 
shape the credibility of  the deterrent threats 
and promises that states convey to others.
How then does Russia conceptualise, and 
put into practice, deterrence? Though some 
observers regard Russia as revisionist, Russia 
still practices deterrence in order to contain 
nuclear and conventional threats to its physical 
security as well as to defend its inluence in key 
neighbouring countries like Ukraine. Russia 
might treat each of  these interests as vital, but 
its strategic problem is that it has regional but 
not global escalation dominance. Put diferently, 
although it may be militarily superior to its 
immediate neighbours on its western borders, 
Russia faces a major imbalance in power with 
respect to the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). It is manifold stronger than Poland 
and the Baltic countries located in NATO’s northeastern 
lank. Yet direct military action against those countries 
could trigger a severe response from the United States and 
other members of  NATO. To be sure, such a response 
is not automatic: Article 5 of  the North Atlantic Treaty 
stipulates that an attack against one is an attack against all 
but it does not bind NATO members to use military force 
in the defence of  others. However, the resulting ambiguity 
creates uncertainty both for vulnerable NATO members and 
potentially opportunistic adversaries like Russia. 
Russian leaders and defence planners have had to struggle to 
reconceptualise deterrence in a manner that is appropriate 
for their country’s geopolitical situation. In outlining the 
Russian concept of  ‘strategic deterrence’, Kristen Ven 
Bruusgard documents how Russian military-theoretical 
debates centre on how Russia could use its political and 
military tools so as to prevent NATO from encroaching on 
its security interests. She argues that Russian deterrence 
theorists understand the concept as including elements of  
Western notions of  containment and coercion. For Russian 
theorists and practitioners, deterrence does not only involve 
conlict prevention, but also the de-escalation of  an ongoing 
military conlict. Accordingly, despite not having escalation 
dominance over potential adversaries like NATO, Russia 
still depends on its nuclear arsenal to thwart conventional 
and nuclear threats in addition to holding of any aggressor 
in a conventional conlict. For this reason Russia disavowed 
a nuclear no-irst-use policy in the 1990s. Nevertheless, 
Russia has been modernising its conventional forces so as to 
improve its war-ighting capabilities and to reduce steadily its 
purported reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence.
These Russian-speciic understandings of  deterrence might 
seem familiar to those who know NATO’s history. For much 
of  the Cold War, the United States and its Western allies 
had to face an unfavourable distribution of  
conventional military power in Europe. Nuclear 
weapons thus helped to ofset the conventional 
military superiority of  the Warsaw Pact. Even 
the oicial doctrine of  lexible response was 
premised partly on the idea that tactical nuclear 
weapons could keep armed hostilities from 
escalating further.
What might be less familiar – or more opaque 
– to Western observers is how Russia would 
use non-military means for the purposes of  
deterrence. Indeed, it is easy to forget that 
deterrence involves more than using military 
capabilities for the sake of  manipulating the 
cost-beneit calculations of  others to one’s 
favour. After all, a relatively weak deterring 
state has incentives to negate the willingness of  
its more capable adversary to use its superior 
strength. If  geopolitical interests partly determine 
willingness, then the deterring state could strive to convince its 
adversary that none are at stake over a given issue-area. The 
deterring state might even persuade its adversary that they 
have a shared interest in sustaining what might otherwise be a 
contentious interpretation of  the status quo.
Russia is a weaker major power that has implemented 
such forms of  deterrence. Consider its foreign policy 
conduct since it began hostile operations against Ukraine 
upon annexing Crimea in 2014. Although it may be odd 
to see deterrence in practice when Russia is attempting 
to take territory from another sovereign state, this case 
is instructive. For one, Russia has an interest in keeping 
the conlict localised. It wishes to prevent Ukraine from 
launching military action in order to regain Crimea and 
other regions under dispute. For another, Russia wishes to 
limit the backlash from members of  NATO. It wants to avoid 
economic sanctions and to keep supporters of  Ukraine from 
providing it with meaningful military assistance. 
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Russia has undertaken several measures 
intended to forestall such unfavourable 
political and military responses to its eforts 
against Ukraine. One is that Russia has 
cultivated a network of  politicians and activists 
friendly to its interests by aligning with anti-
establishmentarian political movements and 
parties in the societies of  NATO member-
states. Vladimir Putin’s courting of  Donald 
Trump and his campaign advisers is just the 
latest example of  such an efort. Another is 
its manipulation of  ethnic politics in Eastern 
Europe – a region with which it is naturally 
more familiar than other major powers in the 
west like the United States and France. 
Russia can exploit the complexity of  local 
political grievances so as to hide its involvement, to delect 
responsibility or to justify an intervention when necessary. 
Russia could thus deliberately create misperceptions 
that render adversaries self-deterred from acting. 
Russia minimises the risk that an armed conlict 
would escalate beyond its control. 
Yet a fundamental problem characterises how 
Russia uses both military and non-military 
means for practicing its version of  deterrence. 
Recall the need for a state to communicate its 
intentions and preferences in issuing a deterrent 
threat. Absent a common understanding of  
what is acceptable and what would happen 
under certain conditions, deterrence becomes 
harder to achieve. Unfortunately, Russia’s 
capabilities and force posture do not match its 
proclamations that (tactical) nuclear weapons 
serve to deter large-scale conventional conlict. 
Large-scale snap military exercises and 
light intercepts ofer reminders of  Russia’s 
conventional military might, but they seem 
unlinked to speciic deterrent threats. Similarly 
ambiguous is how Russia would behave if  its 
eforts to undermine western willingness fail 
to produce the desired efect. Indeed, Russia has done a 
poor job in conveying reassurance due to its lack of  
clarity as to how it would reward, if  at all, actions by 
NATO members that it deems desirable. Beyond 
understanding how Russia conceptualises and 
practices deterrence, therefore, NATO civilian 
and military leaders must emphasise the value of  
reassurance to their Russian interlocutors.
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